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I. Introduction
All jurisdictions supply corporations and their stakeholders with a number of
legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or
dominant shareholders, who are in control. Fiduciary duties, disclosure pro-
visions, shareholder approval requirements, liability suits, actions to have
self-dealing transactions declared void, criminal sanctions and administrative
intervention are available, often jointly, to protect the interests of minority
shareholders and other stakeholders against insiders’ opportunism.
As previous research has shown, these rules, doctrines and remedies are far
from uniform across jurisdictions, leading to significant differences in the 
degree of investor protection that they provide. For instance, Djankov et al.
have conducted a comparative study on the regulation of self-dealing based
on answers to a questionnaire sent to lawyers from 72 countries.1 The quest-
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1 Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, ‘The
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’, December 2005, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=864645. Their paper draws upon, and updates, the seminal articles written by a
partly overlapping group of authors also known as LLSV from the family name initials 
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ionnaire contains a number of questions on how the law on the books would
treat a hypothetical self-dealing transaction involving a dominant share-
holder. In order to conduct an econometric analysis of the correlation be-
tween corporate governance law (approximated by the treatment of self-
dealing) and finance, they assign scores according to whether jurisdictions
impose some procedural steps or disclosure duties and make some remedies
available. Using these scores, they build an anti-self-dealing index as a proxy
for the quality of corporate law. Even looking at the European Union (EU)
only, the dispersion among the 20 EU jurisdictions they cover is consider-
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of four of them (see especially Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998); Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’,
61 J. Fin. 1 (2006)). The influence of LLSV’s work on the literature and the policy debate
has only been equal to the amounts of criticism it has drawn. See, most comprehensively,
Holger Spamann, ‘On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al’s ‘Anti-
Director Rights Index’ under Consistent Coding’, Harvard Law School Olin Fellows’
Discussion Paper No. 7, 3/2006; see also Detlev Vagts, ‘Comparative company law – The
new wave’, in Festschrift für Jean Nicolas Druey 595 (Rainer J. Schweizer, Herbert Bur-
kert & Urs Gasser eds. 2002) (discussing LLSV’s antidirector index from a more tradi-
tional comparative law perspective); Sofie Cools, ‘The Real Difference in Corporate Law
between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers’, 30 Del. 
J. Corp. L. 697, 704–736 (2005) (criticizing the LLSV index for France and Belgium); 
Mathias M. Siems, ‘What Does Not Work in Securities Law: A Critique of La Porta et
al.’s Methodology’, 16 Int’l. Company & Comm. L. Rev. 300 (2005) (criticizing LLSV’s
recent work on securities law, supra, on the grounds of principles of comparative law);
Udo C. Braendle, ‘Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany – “Law and Fi-
nance” Revisited’, 7 German L.J. 257, 265–277 (2006) (re-coding the antidirector index
for Germany and the US); Priya P. Lele & Mathias Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection: 
A Leximetric Approach’, 7 J. Corp. L. Studies 17 (2007) (constructing an alternative 
index for five countries). Djankov et al.’s more recent study (supra) eschews or alleviates
some of the problems, but has some of its own. See e.g. Susanne Kalss, 3. Kapitel: Kapital-
verfassung, in Die Reform des österreichischen Kapitalgesellschaftsrechts, Verhandlungen
des Sechzehnten österreichischen Juristentags, Band II/1 295, 370 n. 232 (Susanne Kalss
& Martin Schauer 2006) (considering it as a severe methodological flaw that Djankov et
al.’s study assumes that the hypothetical shareholder engaged in self-dealing is also a di-
rector of the firm, which creates a bias in favor of jurisdictions having special 
rules on conflicts of interest of directors, but misses the point with respect to self-dealing
by large shareholders as such); John Armour, ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Company
Law: A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment’ 16–17, unpublished paper (on file with the
authors) (finding a number of errors in Djankov et al.’s coding for private enforcement
with reference to the UK, and recalculating a score of 0.625 instead of 0.93 for UK’s
antiself-dealing index); see also Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, ‘Diversity in Share-
holder Protection in Common Law Countries’, J. Institutional Comparisons, March
2007, at 3 (arguing that shareholder protection varies to a high degree even among com-
mon law countries). 
able: on a scale from 0 to 1, scores range from 0.20 for Hungary to 0.93 for
the UK. Looking at continental Europe, where dominant shareholders are
much more commonly in control of listed corporations and where their self-
dealing is thus more relevant to corporate governance, the study finds scores
of 0.38, 0.28, and 0.39 for the three main countries (respectively France, Ger-
many, and Italy) (Figure 1).
Without doubt, Djankov et al’s paper has set a new standard for comparative
spadework. With the objective of econometric analysis in mind, the level of
functional comparison is necessarily crude. What little we know may also be
distorted by an error of perspective that comparative corporate governance
scholars risk making. It is in fact tempting to compare corporate laws by 
taking one benchmark jurisdiction, typically the US, and to assess the quality
of other countries’ corporate law systems depending on how much they re-
plicate some prominent features of US law, such as for example Delaware
Courts’ emphasis on approval of self-dealing transactions by a majority of
the minority shareholders.2 This approach may provide a distorted picture of
the effectiveness of other corporate laws, because it might fail to account for
legal strategies and enforcement tools that, while unknown to the US corpo-
rate governance regime, allow countries to tackle self-dealing differently, but
494 ECFR 4/2007
2 See e.g. Mary A. Jacobson, ‘Interested Director Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects
of Shareholder Ratification’, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 980, 994 (1996).
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Figure 1. Anti-self-dealing index for EU countries covered by Djankov et al.’s study.
no less effectively than the US, or, in other words, to achieve functional as 
opposed to formal convergence.3
This paper describes how three main continental European countries
(France, Germany, and Italy) regulate dominant shareholders’ self-dealing by
looking at all the possible rules, doctrines and remedies available there. We
focus on dominant shareholders’, as opposed to managerial self-dealing, be-
cause it is a well-known fact that in the three countries we consider even the
largest listed corporations have often dominant shareholders.4 When this is
the case, dominant shareholders are in the best position to monitor managers
and prevent their opportunism, but they may abuse their power by extracting
pecuniary private benefits of control in various ways. While managerial self-
dealing and self-dealing by large shareholders overlap, there may sometimes
be different legal instruments addressing the two.
Quite apart from outright theft, dominant shareholders can extract pecuniary
private benefits, first of all, by entering into contracts with the corporation,
whether directly or, more often, through other entities they control (related-
party transactions). In continental Europe this is often done in the form of 
intra-group transactions. The dominant shareholder controls a number of
companies, both listed and unlisted, and coordinates their businesses at vary-
ing degrees. She may have one company pooling cash from the whole group
and allocating it according to the liquidity and investment needs of the vari-
ous group entities. She may have one company providing accounting services
to the whole group. She may also allow the whole group to reduce its tax 
burden by transferring profits from highly profitable companies to ones that
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3 This phenomenon might explain some coding mistakes in Djankov et al’s recent study
(supra note 1). For example, someone familiar with German or Austrian corporate law 
might notice that the sample transaction in their paper would qualify as a “concealed dis-
tribution” (infra section II.2). It is thus mysterious why the rescission variable is coded
as 0 for the two countries. Although the authors have not disclosed their questionnaire,
the variable definitions lend themselves to the conclusion that local correspondents were
misled by questions aiming at an American-style duty-of-loyalty review. See also Lele &
Siems, supra note 1, at 35–37 (finding that protection of minority shareholders against
controlling ones is better developed in France and Germany, which are characterized by
concentrated ownership, than in the US and the UK).
4 See e.g. Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, ‘Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental
Europe’, 21 J. Econ. Persp. 117, 118–19 (2007). In fact, the empirical evidence shows 
that dispersed share ownership is prevalent only in two countries, the US and the UK.
See Randall K. Morck, ‘Introduction, in Concentrated Ownership Structure’ 1, 1 (Ran-
dall K. Morck ed. 2000); Ronald J. Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: Complicating the Corporate Taxonomy’, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1645–1650
(2006) (both summarizing cross-country evidence).
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lose money via transfer-pricing.5 While this kind of coordination may serve
legitimate business purposes, each intra-group transaction provides an op-
portunity for minority shareholder expropriation, especially if it involves
companies in which the dominant shareholder owns a different share of cash-
flow rights, such as one listed company and a wholly owned subsidiary.
Dominant shareholders are often wealthy individuals or families, who might
take up a direct role in the management of the companies they control. When
this is the case, the shareholders in control, like managers in publicly held
companies, might extract private benefits in the form of above-market com-
pensation packages or through perquisites. Following Johnson et al., we use
the term “tunneling” to refer to all kinds of transfers of resources out of a
company to a dominant shareholder (or a coalition of shareholders jointly
dominating the firm).6
Further, dominant shareholders can enrich themselves at the expense of
minority shareholders by having the corporation approve transactions that,
while not involving any sale or purchase by the company, dilute minority
shareholders’ interests (stock dilution). This is done through mergers with
entities also controlled by the dominant shareholders, or by issuing watered
stock in their or their associates’ favor or by having the corporation buy back
their shares at an inflated price.
Since in all of the above cases the dominant shareholder is, personally or
through a controlled entity or an associate, on the other side of the relevant
transactions with the corporation, we categorize all of these transactions as
self-dealing.7
496 ECFR 4/2007
5 Some tax systems create additional incentives to create group structures by permitting
the intra-group setoff of profits and losses if the group is closely integrated. For example,
under § 14 of the German Corporation Tax Act (KStG), group members must undertake
to transfer all of their profits to the dominant enterprise for a period of at least five years
in order to qualify for this privilege.
6 Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
‘Tunneling’, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. (Proc. Am. Econ. Assoc.) 22, 22–23 (2000).
7 Self-dealing, even thus broadly defined, of course does not cover all means dominant
shareholders have to divert corporate value to themselves. They achieve the same out-
come also by trading in the company’s shares on the basis of inside information or other-
wise exploiting inside information to their own advantage (for the qualification of in-
sider trading as self-dealing see e.g. Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 145 (1986)), by
disseminating false information about the company, in order to raise new equity more
cheaply to the detriment of the new shareholders, and by selling their controlling stake
to someone else (see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Controlling Controlling
Shareholders’, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785 (2003)). However, we think that self-dealing as we
have defined it covers a sufficiently broad array of opportunistic behavior to provide 
an accurate picture of how the laws constrain dominant shareholders’ opportunism in
the three sample countries.
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To avoid the perspective error we highlighted above, we have adopted a 
“domestic” point of view for each of the three sample jurisdictions and
drawn up a sort of checklist of rules, doctrines, remedies and provisions that
a local practitioner would have to consider in providing advice on a self-
dealing transaction by a dominant shareholder and in highlighting legal risks
attaching to them.
Our checklist includes: (a) rules specifying whether and how the company
may enter into some transactions or take some resolutions; (b) general stan-
dards and doctrines that constrain managers’ and dominant shareholders’ be-
havior; (c) remedies and actions that a legal system supplies to private parties
so as to react to self-dealing transactions; (d) criminal sanctions against self-
dealing. Problems of stock dilution are addressed by various sets of mainly
rule-based strategies in all three countries, which we address separately in
section V.
Our purpose here is simply to provide a complete picture of the variety of
available legal tools in the three countries, rather than engaging in an in-depth
analysis of each or any of them. Unless otherwise indicated, our description
below focuses on public companies (Société anonyme or SA, Aktiengesell-
schaft or AG, and Società per azioni or Spa). Private limited companies 
(Société à responsabilité limitée or SARL, Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haf-
tung or GmbH; società a responsabilità limitata or Srl) typically pose a dif-
ferent set of problems, as minority shareholders are not subject to collective
action problems, there are fewer limitations on suits, and because self-dealing
is even sometimes an issue addressed in the company’s charter.
Of course, the doctrines and remedies we describe are familiar enough to cor-
porate lawyers and legal scholars from the respective countries. This is appa-
rently less true for many economists researching at the intersection of law
and finance, and many Anglophone legal scholars engaged in the comparative
discussion. Our purpose is to make the wider range of doctrines available in
continental Europe more familiar to these audiences, and, in doing so, to
highlight core problems of enforcement which appear to interfere with the
workings of legal strategies against self-dealing. Our overview shows that all
three countries provide a large array of doctrines and remedies against self-
dealing. Some of them are different from those familiar to English-speaking
scholars and have received little attention in the comparative debate, such 
as the German prohibition against concealed distributions or the role of 
minority shareholders in the prosecution of abus de biens sociaux in France.
Regarding enforcement, we highlight the importance of nullification suits in
all three countries, whereas liability suits remain rare compared to the US,
which may be due to certain aspects of continental European procedural law
ECFR 4/2007 497Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses legal strategies against 
tunneling, including both ex ante rules and ex post standards, i.e. the doc-
trines available in the three countries. Section III investigates remedies. We 
particularly focus on how minority shareholders may challenge a trans-
action initiated by a large shareholder, and what impediments there may be.
Section IV discusses possible consequences under criminal law. Section V dis-
cusses rules and standards against stock dilution. Section VI concludes.
II. Legal strategies against tunneling
Legal systems may use a variety of strategies to police tunneling, which 
basically fall into three groups. First, potentially dangerous transactions may
require ex ante approval or ex post ratification, e.g. by disinterested directors
or shareholders. Second, transactions may be reviewed by a court ex post in
the light of a certain standard of conduct. And third, potentially problematic
transactions may be subjected to a disclosure requirement, so as to facilitate
the ex post evaluation of the firm’s position by minority investors.8
1. Rules on how to enter into self-dealing transactions
Legal systems often impose procedural requirements as a condition to a self-
dealing transaction’s validity or anyhow encourage companies to follow a 
given procedure by making it harder for plaintiffs to challenge procedurally
fair transactions. In France, all transactions concerning an SA in which a 
director or, since 2001, a shareholder with more than 10 percent of the voting
rights9, or the company controlling such shareholder, has a direct or indirect
interest must be authorized ex ante by the board of directors and ratified by
the annual shareholder meeting, following a special report by the statutory
auditors (commissaires aux comptes).10 The interested party must inform the
board of directors about the considered transaction11 and abstain from voting
both within the board and at the shareholders meeting.12 However, these 
rules do not apply to “current transactions entered into at normal condi-
tions”, which only have to be disclosed by the interested party to the chair-
498 ECFR 4/2007
8 But see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, ‘Agency Problems and Legal Strate-
gies’ 21, 23–24, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Reinier Kraakman et al. 2004)
(using a fairly different classification).
9 The level was raised from 5 % to 10 % in 2003.
10 Articles L. 225–38 and L. 225–40, French C. Com.
11 Article L. 225–40, French C. Com.
12 Article L. 225–40, French C. Com.
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man of the board, who must then provide a list of such transactions to the
board and to the statutory auditors.13
French law also prohibits some forms of self-dealing which are deemed to be
too dangerous. This is the case of loans to managers or directors or guaran-
tees for their benefit.14 However, loans to shareholders, whether individuals
or legal entities, are not prohibited.
In Italy, directors have to disclose to other board members and to the mem-
bers of the board of auditors15 any direct or indirect interest they have in any
transaction. An indirect interest may well be deemed to exist whenever a 
dominant shareholder having an interest in a transaction also has influence
over a director,16 e.g. because the director is also an employee of the parent
company ultimately controlled by the dominant shareholder. When it is the
CEO or another executive director who has an interest (direct or indirect) in
a transaction that she would have the power to decide on, she has to abstain
and request for a board resolution on the transaction. Further, whenever the
board decides on a transaction for which an interest has been disclosed or
should have been disclosed, it has to provide adequate reasons for entering
into the transaction and why the transaction is advantageous to the corpora-
tion.17
In Germany, while the management board of an AG normally has the 
authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the company, this is not the 
case in dealings with any of the board members. The supervisory board 
represents the company vis-à-vis them.18 There are no procedural rules 
comparable to the French ones addressing transactions with other related
ECFR 4/2007 499
13 Article L. 225–39, French C. Com.
14 Article L. 225–43, French C. Com.
15 Italian companies traditionally have a board of auditors, i.e. a separate organ of the 
corporation in charge of auditing the company’s management. Although the board of
auditors has become optional after the 2003 reform, which allows companies to opt into
a two-tier, German style, corporate governance structure, or into a one-tier, Anglo-
American style one, most companies have stuck to the traditional structure.
16 Cf. Luca Enriques, ‘Il Conflitto d’Interessi degli Amministratori di Società per Azioni’
156–57 (2000).
17 Article 2391, Italian C.c. Prior to the 2003 corporate law reform, disclosure was only
required for transaction in which a director had a conflict of interest, but the director
also had to abstain from voting on the board resolution relating to the transaction,
which is not the case any more. However, these provisions were construed very leni-
ently. See Luca Enriques, ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence from 
Milan’, 3 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 765, 771 (2002).
18 § 112 AktG.
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parties.19 The courts have been relatively restrictive in their interpretation of
the provision described above, and have typically not applied it to other 
self-dealing situations by analogy (with the exception of cases of “economic
identity” between the director and a third party). For example, one court of
appeals refused to apply the provision to a situation where one company’s 
director held a significant stake in another firm to which he granted a loan in
his capacity as a director of the former.20
2. Standards: shareholder duties
In all three jurisdictions, standards are in place that restrict directors’ ability
to manage the company in the interest of dominant shareholders alone 
and the ability of dominant shareholders to exercise control powers to the
detriment of other shareholders. First, legal scholars and courts hold that 
directors in all countries owe their company a duty of loyalty that require
them to disregard or even oppose dominant shareholders’ attempts to self-
deal.21 Second, whether implicitly or explicitly, the three countries grant 
500 ECFR 4/2007
19 Of course, a transaction can be void under general principles of civil law in cases of col-
lusion (where directors and third parties consciously cooperate to the harm of the firm).
See generally Eberhard Schilken, in J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuch § 167, comments 93 et seq., 100 et seq. (Erstes Buch Allgemeiner Teil, 
§§ 164–240, 13th ed., Karl-Heinz Gursky, Frank Peters, Eberhard Schilken & Olaf Wer-
ner 1995). Furthermore, § 181 BGB, under which an agent cannot enter into a trans-
action with her principal on her own behalf or on behalf of a third party unless per-
mitted to do so, also applies to directors. See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, in Groß-
kommentar Aktiengesetz, § 112, comment 44 (4th ed., 24th installment, Klaus J. Hopt &
Herbert Wiedemann eds. 2005).
20 OLG Saarbrücken, 30.10.2000, 8 U 71/00, AG 2001, 483 = NZG 2001, 414. The major-
ity shareholder of both firms was a partnership, and both firms shared their office
space. See also Hopt & Roth, supra note 19, § 112, comment 43 (stating that, while
there is universal agreement that § 112 does not apply to transactions with firms where
a director holds a minority stake, the director might have a duty to disclose her conflict
of interest to the supervisory board).
21 For Germany, see e.g. Hopt & Roth, supra note 19, § 116, comment 181, 184 (stating
that a supervisory board member violates her duty of loyalty if acting contrary to the
interest of the company and to the benefit of another, even if she also holds a board 
position there); § 116, comment 188 (stating that instructions to the contrary must 
be ignored); § 116, comment (stating that supervisory board members must leave 
corporate opportunities to the firm). In France, such a duty has been recognized by
case law. The duty of loyalty is owed to the shareholders (Cass. Com. 27 February
1996, JCP éd. E 1996, II, 838, n. D. Schmidt and N. Dion) and to the company (Cass.
Com., 24 February 1998, Bull. Joly 1998, p. 913, n. B. Petit. For Italy see e.g. Francesco 
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shareholders a right to be treated equally by the corporation, which might
prevent it from granting unjustified benefits to its dominant shareholders.22
Further, German courts have held that shareholders hold a duty of loyalty to
each other. For example, in the seminal Linotype case of 1988, the 96 percent
corporate shareholder of an AG had initiated a shareholder resolution to 
dissolve the firm in order to integrate its profitable business into its own. The
Federal Supreme Court nullified that resolution, because it found that the
majority shareholder had violated its duty of loyalty by using its voting right
to obtain a special advantage to the detriment of the minority.23 France and
Italy provide for “abuse of majority powers” (abus de majorité in France;
abuso della maggioranza in Italy) doctrines that restrict majority share-
holders’ freedom to vote as they wish at general meetings. In fact, they may
not exercise their voting rights in such a way as to pursue their own self-
interest (and not the company’s) to the detriment of fellow shareholders.24 In
France, case law considers that there is an abuse of majority if a majority 
shareholder votes against the “corporate interest” of the company, in order 
to pursue her own personal interest and to detriment of the minority share-
holders.25
Additionally, § 117 I of the German AktG provides that a person using her
influence on the company to instruct members of the supervisory or manage-
ment board to act to the detriment of the firm or its shareholders will be 
liable for damages resulting from this conduct. Until 2005, § 117 VI 1 pro-
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Barachini, ‘L’appropriazione delle corporate opportunities come fattispecie di infedeltà
degli amministratori di s.p.a.’, in 2 Il nuovo diritto delle società. Liber Amicorum Gian
Franco Campobasso 605, 605–06 (Pietro Abbadessa & Giuseppe B. Portale eds.) (2006).
See also Cass. 24 August 2004, No. 16707 (for the first time explicitly recognizing the
existence of a duty of loyalty).
22 This is made explicit by Art. 42 of the Second Directive; § 53a AktG; Art. 1832 French
C. civil. For Italy see Article 92, Legislative Decree 1998, No. 58 (for listed companies).
For non-listed companies there is no explicit provision. But legal scholars tend to re-
cognize that such is a principle valid also for them. See Carlo Angelici, Parità di tratta-
mento degli azionisti, 1987/I Rivista di Diritto Commerciale 1, passim.
23 BGH 1.2.1988, II ZR 75/87, BGHZ 103, 185; see also BGH 22.6.1992, II ZR 178/90,
NJW 1992, 3167 (discussing the duty of loyalty in the context of a capital increase).
24 For Italy see e.g. Fabrizio Guerrera, ‘Abuso del voto e controllo “di correttezza” sul
procedimento deliberativo assembleare’, 2002 Rivista delle Società 181, passim. For
France, see e.g. J.-P. Legros, ‘La nullité des décisions de sociétés’, Rev. sociétés, 1991, 
n° 42, 297; J.-P. Sortais, Abus de droit (Majorité, minorité, égalité), Encyclopédie Dalloz
droit des sociétés (2003).
25 See e.g., B. Lecourt, Cass. Com. 1st July 2003, Société Mécano soudure c/ Antoine Ba-
lice, Rev. sociétés 2004, p. 337. For shareholders’ conflicts of interests in the general
meeting under Italian law see infra note 95.
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vided an exemption for those cases where a shareholder had used its voting
power in the shareholder meeting to instruct the company’s representatives.26
Currently, exemptions apply only when the company is part of a contractual
group or when it has been integrated into its 100 % parent firm under § 319
AktG.27
3. Prohibition against concealed distributions to shareholders
German law also deals with self-dealing between the dominant shareholder
and the corporation by qualifying such transactions, whenever its economic
terms are unfair to the corporation, as concealed distributions. § 57 AktG
provides that capital contributions may not be repaid to shareholders. During
the life of the company, only accounting profits may be distributed among
them.28 It may surprise that a doctrine related to legal capital, which is under
attack as an inefficient mechanism of creditor (and not shareholder) pro-
tection,29 might serve a useful purpose for the protection of minority share-
holders. However, the basic idea of the doctrine, which has a long pedigree 
in case law going back to the 1920s, is quite simple: whenever a corporation
enters into a transaction with a shareholder (or a related party) on unfavor-
able terms, this constitutes a de facto distribution to that shareholder. In an
AG, such a transaction is illegal irrespective of how much equity capital 
the company actually has, since all distributions must take the form of a 
dividend.30
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26 The exemption’s interaction with the shareholder’s duty of loyalty was not entirely
clear. See Michael Kort, in Großkommentar Aktiengesetz, supra note 19, § 117, note
239; BGHZ 129, 136, 158 et seq.
27 § 117 VII AktG. In the former case, shareholders are entitled to compensation. See 
infra section V.2.
28 § 57 III AktG.
29 See John Armour, ‘Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern
Company Law’, 63 Modern L. Rev. 355 (2000); Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey,
‘Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal Capital 
Rules’, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1165, 1185–88 (2001); Peter O. Mülbert & Max Birke, ‘Legal
Capital – Is There a Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules?’, 3 Eur. Bus. Org.
L. Rev. 695, 732 (2002).
30 § 57 III AktG. By contrast, a GmbH is only allowed to make distributions to share-
holders as long as the firm’s legal capital remains intact (§ 30 I GmbHG), which is why
the doctrine comes to bear in GmbHs typically only in insolvency situations. Claw-
back from shareholders is only possible within a period five years in AGs and within 
10 years in GmbHs (§ 62 III AktG, § 31 V GmbHG) and is ruled out by good faith of
the recipient (§ 62 I AktG, § 31 II GmbHG). In GmbHs, the other shareholders are
proportionally liable for illegal distributions, with a limitation period of five years 
applying (§ 31 III, V GmbHG).
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No such doctrine has received any considerable attention in Italy 31 or in
France.32 In both countries, like in Germany, though, in line with the Second
directive, special rules on share buy-backs are in place.33
4. Rules and standards against disadvantageous transactions 
in corporate groups
German law is known for its special rules on corporate groups that were in-
troduced in the 1965 reform. It distinguishes between contractual groups and
de facto groups. A contractual group is created by a control agreement, under
which instructions to the controlled firm become permissible even if they are
to the benefit of the controller or other firms within the group.34 Hence, the
creation of a contractual group – which is normally motivated by tax con-
siderations – is an issue of stock dilution akin to a parent-subsidiary merger,
which is why we discuss it in section V.2.
By contrast, an AG may be subject to the law on de facto groups without an
agreement by virtue of being under the control of a controlling undertaking.
Group law does not apply if the controller is not an undertaking, the defini-
tion of which is not entirely clear.35 Individuals who are not as such engaged
in business are not included in the definition. However, the controlling
undertaking need not be another corporation.
In a de facto group, the controlling undertaking may not instruct a controlled
firm to enter into disadvantageous transactions unless any disadvantages are
compensated for; the compensation must be determined in the same financial
year at the latest.36 The management board of the controlled company is re-
quired to prepare a report on relations with other group firms within the first
three months of the year, in which all intra-group transactions of the firm are
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31 Cf. Massimo Miola, ‘Legal Capital Rules in Italian Company Law and the EU Perspec-
tive, in Legal Capital in Europe’, ECFR Special Volume No 1, 515, 528 (Marcus Lutter
ed. 2006).
32 Cf. Holger Fleischer, ‘Disguised Distributions and Capital Maintenance in European
Company Law, in Legal Capital in Europe’, ECFR Special Volume No 1, 94, 102–05
(Marcus Lutter ed. 2006) (describing the formalistic understanding of distributions in
France).
33 For France see, Articles L. 225–207 to L. 225–217, French C. Com.; for Germany see 
§§ 71–71e AktG; for Italy, see Article 2357–2359-quater, Italian C.c., and Article 132,
Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 February 1998.
34 § 308 AktG.
35 See Karsten Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht 935–939, 1212–1214 (4th ed. 2002).
36 § 311 AktG.
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described and compensation received is discussed. This “dependency report”
(Abhängigkeitsbericht) must be audited by the statutory auditor and the 
supervisory board, which reports to the shareholder meeting.37 The require-
ments for the appointment of a special auditor are relaxed if the statutory 
auditor or the supervisory board found irregularities or if the management
board itself declares that disadvantageous transactions were not compensated
for.38
Notably, the requirements for derivative suits by the shareholders of the 
controlled entity are relaxed in corporate groups.39
At least since the 1980s, Italian legal scholars have pointed out that the harm
caused by one single intra-group transaction might find compensation in
other transactions or group relationships, whether past or future (the so-
called “teoria dei vantaggi compensativi” or theory of compensatory group
advantages).40 Courts have tended to uphold such a theory in the last two 
decades.41
Mainly following such scholarly and case-law developments, the 2003 corpo-
rate law reform has for the first time provided for specific rules on integrated
groups and intra-group transactions, basically recognizing that controlled
companies can be managed as a division of a group-integrated business. At
the same time, it introduced procedural rules to be followed in intra-group
transactions, together with an obscure standard for the ex post review of the
overall fairness of managerial decisions within the group to minority share-
holders and creditors. On the one hand, subsidiaries have to provide an “ana-
lytical justification” of transactions that are entered into under the influence
of the parent company, by specifying the reasons and the interests that have
been considered in deciding to enter into them. Further, account of such
transactions must be given in the annual report. On the other hand, minority
504 ECFR 4/2007
37 §§ 313, 314 AktG. Note that shareholders do not have access to the dependency report.
38 § 315 AktG. Infra section III.2.
39 Infra section III.1.
40 See e.g. Berardino Libonati, ‘Gli atti compiuti dalla società controllata a favore della 
società controllante’, 1989 Rivista di diritto commerciale, II/220; Paolo Ferro-Luzzi &
Piergaetano Marchetti, ‘Riflessioni sul Gruppo Creditizio’, 1994 Giurisprudenza com-
merciale, I/419, I/453–54; Paolo Montalenti, ‘Conflitto di interesse nei gruppi di società
e teoria dei vantaggi compensativi’, 1995 Giurisprudenza commerciale, I/710, I/731–32.
41 See Vincenzo Cariello, ‘The “Compensation” of Damages with Advantages Deriving
from Management and Co-ordination Activity (Direzione e Coordinamento) of the
Parent Company (Article 2497, Paragraph 1, Italian Civil Code)’, 3 Eur. Comp. & Fin.
L. Rev. 330, 331 (2006) for references. See also Enriques, supra note 17, at 796 for a sum-
mary of two Milan court cases applying the group defense.
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shareholders of subsidiary corporations can sue the parent company and its
directors for pro rata damages suffered qua shareholders if the parent, ac-
cording to the convoluted wording of a new Civil Code provision, “in carry-
ing out its activity of management and co-ordination of the group, acts in its
own or others’ business interests in violation of the principles of correct 
company and business management”. However, the parent “shall not be held
liable when the damage is lacking in light of the overall results of the manage-
ment and co-ordination activity or when the damage has been entirely elimi-
nated, possibly through transactions specifically aimed at such purpose.”42
In France, a few special rules on intra-group transactions apply, but no 
general or partial regime like in Germany and in Italy can be found in the 
statutes. For instance, the law allows loans to directors that are legal entities,
while it prohibits them when granted to directors who are natural persons.43
Further, a special provision allows cash pooling within groups, which other-
wise would be prohibited by banking laws to businesses other than banks.44
While there are no other special rules that allow treating intra-group trans-
actions less severely than other forms of self-dealings who are natural per-
sons, within the context of criminal law, French courts have developed the
Rozenblum doctrine that allows a “group defense.”45
5. Disclosure of related-party transactions
The three countries also provide for “per se” disclosure of self-dealing trans-
actions, i.e. quite apart from the procedural rules that have to be followed 
in order to enter into them. Following EC provisions on annual accounts,
Italian, German and French accounting rules require that individual annual
accounts contain a separate indication of credits toward and shares held in 
affiliated undertakings 46 and undertakings with which the company is linked
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42 Article 2497, Italian C.c.
43 Article L. 225-42 French C. Com.
44 Article L. 511-73; French Monetary and Financial Code.
45 Infra section III.5. Cf. also Maggy Pariente, ‘The Evolution of the Concept of “Corpo-
rate Group” in France’, ECFR, Vol. 4, 2007, p. 317.
46 Affiliated undertakings are defined in Art. 41 of the Seventh Directive, which refers to
Art. 1, which sets out a complex definition when a firm must be included in consolidat-
ed accounts. In other words, “affiliated undertakings” are all corporations which must
be included in one set of consolidated accounts by virtue of having a common con-
trolling or parent company. See § 271 II HGB, Article L. 233-16 French C. com., and
Article 2359 Italian C.c.
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by virtue of participating interests,47 together with debts toward the same
entities and, in Italy, shareholders in general.48 Of course, listed companies in
all three countries have to draw up their consolidated accounts according to
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) since 2005,49 so that IAS
24 on related party transactions applies to them.50 A recent directive that has
yet to be implemented in the Member States has amended the EC Accounting
Directives to require extensive disclosures about material related party trans-
actions that “have not been concluded under normal market conditions,” and
refers to IFRS with respect to the definition of the term “related party.”51
Since 2002, Italian listed companies are required to disclose material related-
party transactions on an ongoing basis.52
6. Summary
While the basic framework of legal strategies against self-dealing is quite 
similar in the three jurisdictions, there are some notable differences. The law
is quite similar regarding disclosure requirements, which have been imple-
mented under the influence of EC law and International Financial Reporting
Standards (section II.5.), and the general standard of conduct for large share-
holders (section II.2.). However, France and Italy rely on ex ante approval re-
quirements to a larger degree than Germany (section II.1.). Germany, on the
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47 Art 17 of the Fourth Directive defines a participating interest as “rights in the capital of
other undertakings, whether or not represented by certificates, which, by creating a 
durable link with those undertakings, are intended to contribute to the company’s 
activities”. Member states may set a threshold not exceeding 20 % beyond which a 
participating interest is presumed. German law sets that presumption at 20 % (§ 271 I
HGB), Italian law generally at 20 %, but only at 10 % in the case of an interest in a 
listed company (Article 2359(3), Italian C.c.); French law sets that presumption at 
10 percent, regardless of whether the company is listed or not (Article L. 233-2, French 
C. Com.).
48 Article 2424, Italian C.c.; § 266 HGB; Article L. 123-13 to L. 123-15, French C. Com.
49 Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1.
50 IAS 24 was endorsed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2238/2004 of 29 December
2004, OJ L 394/1 (2004).
51 Article 43(1)(7b) Fourth Directive and Article 34(7b) Seventh Directive, as amended by 
Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006,
2006 O.J. (L 224) 1.
52 See Article 71–bis, Consob Regulation on Issuers (available at http://www.consob.it/
mainen/documenti/english/laws/reg11971e.htm). Materiality is defined as occurring
when the transactions, “for their contents, consideration, conditions or time of execu-
tion may have an impact on a company’s solvency or on the completeness and faith-
fulness of available information pertaining to the issuer”.
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other hand, has an additional standard of conduct in the guise of the doctrine
of “concealed distributions” (section II.3.). Furthermore, Germany and Italy
have an additional level of detailed provisions addressing corporate groups,
which combine a standard-based approach and reporting requirements 
(section II.4.).
III. Remedies against tunneling
Legal strategies against tunneling are of course pointless without appropriate
remedies and enforcement mechanisms. Besides liability suits as the remedy
most obvious to Anglophone readers, we consider suits to nullify conflicted
transactions and shareholder resolutions. We also describe other minority
rights that may facilitate suits or give bargaining power to minority share-
holders.
1. Liability suits
While in France individual shareholders have traditionally been able to sue
directors on behalf of the corporation (action sociale ut singuli),53 at least 
until recently this has been far more difficult in Germany and especially in
Italy. Before 2005, in German AGs only a shareholder holding 5 % or at least
an amount of shares corresponding to € 500.000 in par value could petition 
a court to appoint a representative to bring a suit on behalf of the company if
the shareholder meeting had decided not to authorize a liability suit.54 Under
the new provisions, a 1 percent or a € 100,000 holding (again in par value) 
is enough,55 while a special “lawsuit admission procedure” (Klagezulassungs-
verfahren) was introduced to screen out abusive suits. Among other things,
plaintiff shareholders must show that the firm failed to bring a suit within 
a reasonable period upon a demand by shareholders. The court must then 
decide whether there are indications that the company suffered damages from
dishonesty or from serious violations of the law or the charter, and whether 
a suit would be contrary to the preponderating interest of the company.56
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53 Article L. 225–252, French C. com.
54 § 147 III AktG (before 2005).
55 § 148 I AktG, as amended by the Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisie-
rung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG), of September 22, 2005, BGBl. I 2005, No. 60., 
p. 2802 (Sept. 27, 2005).
56 § 148 II AktG, as amended by the UMAG, supra note 55.
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The requirements for derivative suits are easier to meet under the law of 
corporate groups.57 In a de facto group, the controlling entity is liable to the
controlled corporation if it instructed the controlled entity to enter into a 
disadvantageous transaction without providing compensation by the end of
the fiscal year or granting a legal title to claim compensation. Managers of the
controlling entity are jointly and severally liable.58 Other than in the case 
of regular derivative suits against managers, such a suit may be brought by
any individual shareholder, without a specific percentage limit. The law also
limits the possibility of settlements.59 Members of the management and super-
visory boards of the controlled corporation may also be liable.60
In Italy, derivative suits were first allowed in 1998 for listed companies only,
and standing to sue was granted to shareholders owning at least 5 percent of the
shares (2.5 percent since 2006; bylaws can provide for a lower threshold). The
2003 corporate law reform made derivative suits available to shareholders in
unlisted corporations, but restricted it to those owning at least 20 percent of
the shares (bylaws can provide for a lower threshold or for a higher one, up
to one third of the shares).61 Similar to Germany, individual shareholders of
subsidiaries in a group have a special action for damages suffered pro rata 
qua shareholders in case of group mismanagement.62
As a consequence of the threshold for standing to sue in derivative suits 63 and
other hurdles to shareholder litigation,64 in Germany and Italy liability suits
against directors have always been rare (even in the case of corporate groups).
Most often, they were brought by the company after a change in control or
by the bankruptcy trustee after the company had gone bankrupt. One should
note, however, that even in France derivative suits have been fairly rare,65
likely due to the absence of the procedural rules (on discovery, legal fees, and
508 ECFR 4/2007
57 Supra section II.4.
58 § 317 III AktG.
59 § 309 III, IV AktG and §§ 310 IV, 317 IV and 318 IV AktG (all referring to § 309 III 
to V).
60 § 318 AktG.
61 Since 2004 any Srl shareholder can sue directors for damages on behalf of the corpora-
tion. See Article 2476, Italian C.c.
62 See supra text preceding note 42.
63 See Kristoffel R. Grechenig & Michael Sekyra, ‘No Derivative Shareholder Suits in 
Europe – A Model of Percentage Limits, Collusion and Residual Owners’, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=933105 (modeling how percentage limits destroy incentives
to bring derivative suits).
64 See generally Luca Enriques, ‘The Comparative Anatomy of Corporate Law’, 52 Am. J.
Comp. L. 1011, 1023–24 (2004).
65 See Yves Guyon, Droit des affaires – Droit commercial général et Sociétés, Tome 1, 
n° 462, p. 506, 2003 (stating that the “action sociale ut singuli” is rarely exercised).
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pleading) that are needed for a plaintiff bar to prosper.66 Among these, the
ban on contingency fees has often been identified as a main hurdle to share-
holder litigation.67 While France still retains the ban, Germany is in the pro-
cess of allowing contingency fees and Italy has recently done so.68 It remains
to be seen whether these prospective or recent changes in German and Italian
laws will spur shareholder suits.
Furthermore, with the exception of the German and Italian laws of corporate
groups described before, derivative suits against shareholders are not nor-
mally admissible.69 However, under Italian and French laws, liability suits can
be brought not only against directors formally elected, but also toward
anyone de facto managing the company by exercising powers that are typical
of a director, like presiding over board meetings, individually making the
main company’s decisions, and so on.70 Typically, this can be the case of a 
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66 See Enriques, supra note 64, at 1023–24.
67 See ibid.
68 The German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) recently declar-
ed the current outright prohibition against contingency fees to be unconstitutional, as it
did not take into account that under certain circumstances contingency fees may facili-
tate the prosecution of legal claims. BVerfG 12.12.2006, 1 BvR 2576/04, NJW 2007,
979. The legislature must amend the law to take the decision into account by June 30,
2008. Italy abolished the ban on contingency fees in July 2006. See Art. 2(1)(a) of
Decree Law 4 July 2006, No. 223, (G.U. 4 July 2006, No. 153), as modified by Law 4
August 2006, No. 248 (G.U. 11 August 2006, No. 186).
69 See Wolfgang Zöllner, ‘Die sogenannten Gesellschafterklagen im Kapitalgesellschafts-
recht’, 17 Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 392, 407–411 (1988).
70 In French law, de facto directors and managers (dirigeants de faits) of solvent compa-
nies are subject to liability not pursuant to the specific provisions of the commercial
code regarding liability, since they do not include de facto managers, but rather under
general tort principles (Article 1382, French civil code). See Cass. com., 21 March, 2005,
Rev. Sociétés 1995, p. 501, n. B. Saintourens. When the company is insolvent, de facto
directors and managers are subject to liability pursuant to specific provisions of the
French commercial code (Article L. 652-1, French C. com.). For Italy see e.g. Trib. Mi-
lano, 11 September 2003, 2003 Diritto e Pratica delle Società, No. 23, 74. German law
has developed a doctrine of de facto managers (“faktischer Geschäftsführer”), who are 
subject to certain duties (e.g. to file for insolvency), but it is disputed and unclear 
how far these duties reach and whether provisions on derivative suits apply. See. e.g.
Holger Altmeppen, in Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung
(GmbHG), § 43, comment 69 (5th ed., Günter H. Roth & Holger Altmeppen eds.); see
also Susanne Kalss, Nikolaus Adensamer & Janine Oelkers, ‘Director’s Duties in the 
Vicinity of Insolvency – a comparative analysis with reports from Germany, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain
and Sweden, in Legal Capital in Europe’, ECFR Special Volume No 1, 112, 115 (Marcus
Lutter ed. 2006). Cf. also § 117, discussed supra in notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
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dominant shareholder.71 Other than that, the widely held view among Italian
legal scholars is that, outside the context of groups,72 majority shareholders
are not liable for damages stemming from the latter’s behavior qua share-
holders, such as for voting in favor of shareholder meeting resolutions harm-
ing minority shareholders.73 Further, if the dominant shareholder’s behavior
has harmed the corporation, a court would deny minority shareholders’
standing to sue derivatively, because, other than when the law so explicitly
provides, derivative actions can only be brought by creditors, and share-
holders as such are held to be no creditors of their corporations.74 On its face,
French law is friendlier to minority shareholders than Italy’s. The controlling
shareholder can be held liable towards the minority shareholder if she acted
with the intention to harm (intention de nuire).75 The standard, however, is
very demanding and plaintiff shareholders seldom win such cases.
Shareholders in all the three countries can also sue directors if they suffer 
damage qua individuals or qua investors as opposed to qua shareholders, 
although only under special circumstances in France and Germany. This is
especially the case in the event of securities fraud, which might also take place
by omitting to inform the public, or by providing false information, on self-
dealing transactions. However, while in Italy negligence is enough to hold 
directors liable,76 for a direct claim against a director German law requires 
to establish either the violation of a protective statute, such as a provision of
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71 See e.g. Niccolò Abriani, ‘Gli Amministratori di Fatto delle Società di Capitali’ 76
(1998).
72 See infra, text preceding note 149.
73 See Roberto Sacchi, ‘Tutela Reale e Tutela Obbligatoria della Minoranza’, in 2 Il nuovo
diritto delle società. supra note 21, 135, at 163–65. But see Fabrizio Guerrera, ‘La Res-
ponsabilità “Deliberativa” nella Società di Capitali’ 290–91 (2004) (arguing on doctrinal
grounds that dominant shareholders may be held liable toward minority shareholders
for abuse of voting powers).
74 See e.g. Federico M. Mucciarelli, ‘L’Azione Sociale di Responsabilità Contro gli Ammi-
nistratori di Società Quotate’, 27 Giurisprudenza Commerciale 59, 71–76 (2000).
75 Cass. Com. 13 March 2001, Bull. civ. IV, n° 60, D. 2001.1175, obs. A. Lienhard, Dr. 
sociétés 2001, n° 101, obs. F. X. Lucas, Rev. Sociétés 2001, p. 818, n. B. Dondero , Bull.
Joly 2001.891, n. C. Prieto, JCP, éd. E, 2001.953, n. A. Viandier, RTD com. 2001.443,
obs. C. Champaud et D. Danet. In this last case, two shareholders have been held liable
for having dismissed the manager of a limited liability company (SARL). The legal
reasoning is applicable to a suit in a SA. See also with a similar fact pattern, Cass. com.
22 November 2005, Rev. Sociétés 2006, p. 526, n. L. Godon.
76 See Article 2395 Italian C.c. See also Franco Bonelli, Gli amministratori di s.p.a. dopo la
riforma delle società 215–22 (2004) (citing the case of damages following trade of secur-
ities in the presence of false annual accounts as the typical case of a direct liability suit
against directors).
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criminal law, or proof of intent.77 Similarly, in France directors and managers
can be held liable for such damages only within a criminal proceeding be-
cause under civil law, except in rare circumstances, only the company itself
can be sued for false or omitted information.78 Finally, in the context of 
corporate law, the German law on de facto groups explicitly stipulates that the
controlling entity is directly liable to minority shareholders if these incurred
an individual damage that does not just reflect a lower share value because of
a damage to the company.79
In France, in the case of an insolvent company, a de jure or de facto director
or manager can be held liable, partially or totally, for the debts of a company
subject to a liquidation procedure (obligations aux dettes), if the insolvency
results, inter alia, from the fact that she used the assets of the company as her
own,80 abused corporate assets for her own interest,81 or misappropriated all
or part of the debtor’s assets.82 Further, a de jure or de facto manager can be
subject to personal bankruptcy (faillite personnelle) for having misappro-
priated all or part of the company’s assets.83
In Italy, bankruptcy trustees may sue directors and de facto directors and 
managers for damages stemming from violation of their duties toward the
corporation and/or toward creditors.84 Similarly, in Germany directors are
liable in tort if they (culpably) fail to file for bankruptcy when the company
is insolvent or overindebted.85
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77 §§ 823 & 826 BGB. See e.g. Eckart Gottschalk, ‘Die persönliche Haftung der Organ-
mitglieder für fehlerhafte Kapitalmarktinformation de lege lata und de lege ferenda’,
2005 Der Konzern 274, 276–278; BGH 19.7.2004, II ZR 402/02, NJW 2004, 2971; see
also Susanne Kalss, ‘Recent developments in liability for nondisclosure of capital 
market information’, 27 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 70, 90–91 (2007); see also BGH 4.6.2007,
II ZR 147/05, AG 2007, 620 and II ZR 173/05, AG 2007 623 (each rejecting a fraud-on-
the-market theory and requiring investors to show causality between disclosure of false
information and specific investment decision).
78 See generally Charles Arsouze & Patrick Ledoux, ‘L’indemnisation des victimes d’in-
fractions boursières’, Bull. Joly Bourse 2006, n° 4, p. 399. Since 2003 there have been
several court suits against listed companies which have been successful.
79 § 317 I AktG.
80 Article L. 652-1 1°, French C. com.
81 Article L. 652-1 2°, French C. com.
82 Article L. 652-1 3°, French C. com.
83 Article 653-3, French C. com. Before the 2006 reform, former Article L. 625-3, French 
C. Com.
84 Article 2394-bis, Italian C.c. Article 2394 of the Italian Civil Code generally makes 
directors liable toward creditors for violation of “duties relating to the preservation of a
company’s assets integrity”, such as duties stemming from legal capital rules.
85 See § 92 II AktG (setting forth the requirement to file for bankruptcy). It is controversial
whether this duty also applies to de facto directors. Kalss et al, supra note 70, at 115.
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Of course, the proceeds from all such suits will be distributed, together 
with the proceeds from liquidation and other suits, first among creditors and
then, if these are paid in full, to shareholders pro rata.86 In Germany and Italy
creditors with claims resulting from a transaction after the time when direc-
tors would have been required to file for bankruptcy have a claim to full com-
pensation against directors, which they must pursue on their own.87
2. Appointment of a special auditor
French law provides that shareholders representing at least 5 percent of the
capital (10 percent until a 2001 reform) may, after having submitted a written
question and received an unsatisfactory explanation, petition the court for the
appointment of a business expert (expert de gestion) in order to gather infor-
mation about business decisions.88 Since these business decisions can some-
times be motivated by directors’ self-interest, appointment of a business ex-
pert can help uncover self dealing. Using this procedure is convenient for 
the minority shareholder since the judge can oblige the company to pay for
the expert’s compensation, which is not the case for the generally applicable
procedure providing for the appointment of a pre-trial court expert (so-called
expertise in futurum).89 Italian law grants minority shareholders a similar
right, but where serious irregularities in the company’s management are 
found, the court may take further measures, such as convening the general
meeting or even removing the directors.90
In Germany, AG shareholders holding 1% or an amount corresponding to 
€ 100.000 of legal capital (down from 10 percent/€ 1,000.000 before the 2005
reform91) may petition the court to appoint a special auditor.92 In a de facto
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86 For Germany, see § 92 InsO (stipulating that claims common to all creditors must be
persued by the insolvency administrator); for Italy, see supra note 84; for France, see
Article L. 652-3, French C. com. (sums recovered under Article L. 652-1 are distributed to
creditors according to their ranking). Of course, if no bankruptcy proceeding follows
insolvency, e.g. because, as under German law, assets are insufficient, or if the bank-
ruptcy proceeding is closed and a creditor has not been satisfied in full, she will have a
direct claim toward the directors for damages stemming from violations of their duties.
87 BGH 6.6.1994, II ZR 292/91, BGHZ 126, 181. See e.g. Kalss et al, supra note 70, at 116.
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group, there is no such threshold. Any individual shareholder may petition a
court to appoint a special auditor if the statutory auditor or the supervisory
board found irregularities, or if the management board itself declares that 
disadvantageous transactions were not compensated for.93 The purpose of the
special audit is to bring to light evidence that might help in a potential suit
against board members.94
3. Nullification of shareholder and board meeting resolutions
In all three jurisdictions, shareholders have the right to challenge in court the
validity of shareholder resolutions, if they violate the company’s bylaws or
the law.95 Voting behavior violating either rules or standards of conduct for
shareholders (such as the duty of loyalty in Germany or the “abuse of major-
ity” prohibition in France and Italy) is considered a violation of the law and
may result in nullification.
Challenges to the validity of shareholder resolutions have traditionally been
used as a shareholder remedy in Italy and Germany, because it is an effective
bargaining tool against the company and its dominant shareholders. In fact,
thanks to the possibility of obtaining a court order requiring directors not to
execute the transaction, shareholders might block important transactions.96
Of course, it is often alleged that the power to block transactions also allows
minority shareholders to blackmail companies into lucrative settlement 
agreements. That explains why in 2003 Italy amended the relevant Code 
provisions so as to reduce minority shareholders’ bargaining power vis-à-vis
the company. Among other changes,97 it restricted standing to sue to share-
holders representing at least 5 percent or 0.1 percent of the shares (for non-
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listed and listed companies respectively).98 Shareholders representing a lower
fraction of shares may only sue the company for damages suffered as a conse-
quence of the resolution’s illegality.99 But they may do so only within 90 days
from the general meeting.100
To the same end, Germany recently introduced a so-called “clearance proce-
dure” (Freigabeverfahren), which allows the court to allow an increase or 
reduction of capital or an agreement to enter a contractual group to proceed
if the suit is patently baseless, or if the alleged violations of the law are less
onerous to the firm and its shareholders than the disadvantage of the trans-
action grounding to a halt.101 Unlike Italy, Germany did not go in the direc-
tion of requiring a minimum ownership threshold for challenges of share-
holder resolutions. In France, there are no restrictions to standing to sue
either.
Of course, the relevance of nullification suits as remedies against self-dealing
by large shareholders hinges on the requirement of a shareholder vote on the
particular self-dealing transaction. Generally, the number of decisions that
must be submitted to the shareholder meeting by law is said to be greater in
continental Europe than in the US.102 However, this may still not be enough
to enable minority shareholders to tackle self-dealing in all cases. Typically,
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and India following a leximetrics approach).
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only major reconfigurations of the corporate structure must be subject to a
vote, including mergers and demergers. However, the well-known German
Holzmüller doctrine illustrates important limitations. Under a seminal case
decided by the German BGH in 1982103, a shareholder vote is required if a
sale touches upon the core of the company’s business.104 The doctrine was 
apparently narrowed by the BGH in the Gelatine105 decision of 2004. While
the precise extent of the Holzmüller doctrine is still not entirely clear,106 the
number of cases submitted to the shareholder meeting may be dwindling
down as a result of Gelatine.
If shareholders lack standing to sue in order to tackle a self-dealing trans-
action, they may resort to what one of us has elsewhere dubbed as “osten-
sible” shareholder litigation, that is, suits by which shareholders, “lacking the
standing to ask a court to judge the specific behavior that purportedly harm-
ed them, … challenge other courses of action or decisions,”107 thus hoping
“to strengthen their bargaining position against insiders.”108 For example, 
minority shareholders may attempt to nullify the annual “discharge” (Ent-
lastung, quitus) of directors, which is of only very limited legal significance,109
or they may seek to nullify the shareholder meeting’s approval of the firm’s
annual accounts.110
Shareholders may also have standing to sue in order to obtain nullification of
a company’s board resolutions. This is the case in France with respect to self-
dealing transactions for which the ex ante authorization of the board of 
directors was not obtained,111 whereas in Italy minority shareholders may 
not challenge the validity of board resolutions taken in violation of the simi-
lar Italian rules on directors’ interests: only dissenting directors and the board
ECFR 4/2007 515
103 BGH 25.2.1982, II ZR 174/80, BGHZ 83, 122.
104 See Marc Loebbe, ‘Corporate Groups: Competences of the Shareholders’ Meeting and
Minority Protection – the German Federal Court of Justice’s recent Gelatine and
Macrotron Cases Redefine the Holzmüller Doctrine’, 5 German L. J. 1057, 1061
(2004).
105 BGH 26.4.2004, II ZR 155/02, BGHZ 159, 30 (finding that “unwritten competences
of the shareholder meeting are only recognized exceptionally and within narrow
boundaries”).
106 See Loebbe, supra note 104, at 1075–76.
107 Enriques, ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Matter?’, supra note 17, at 773.
108 Id., at 789.
109 See e.g. OLG Stuttgart, 11.08.2004, 20 U 3/04, DB 2004, 2094 = NZG 2004, 966 = AG
2005, 94.
110 This is relatively often the case in Italy. See Enriques, ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Mat-
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of auditors may. Individual shareholders in Italy may only challenge the 
validity of board resolutions directly infringing their individual rights toward
the corporation, such as when the board violates a shareholder’s pre-emption
right when issuing new shares.112 In Germany, shareholders cannot challenge
board resolutions.113
4. Nullification of conflict of interest transactions
Under Italian law, if the person acting in the name of the corporation in a self-
dealing transaction can be deemed to have a conflict of interest herself, pos-
sibly for her relationship with the dominant shareholder, then the transaction
is voidable according to general agency law principles. The same is true if a
board resolution is taken with no prior disclosure of a director’s direct or 
indirect interest114 or by her vote or without motivation, provided that the
transaction is harmful to the corporation. However, in either case only the
corporation itself has standing to sue, so that cases of this kind are usually
brought in two cases. First, such suits may be brought opportunistically, 
to renege on a company’s obligations, for instance when it had accepted to
become the guarantor of a related company’s debt toward a bank. Second,
bankruptcy trustees may bring such suits in order to disallow a claim.115
In France, self-dealing transactions are voidable if they were not subject to a
vote by the board of directors and they have a detrimental effect on the com-
pany,116 or if the interested shareholder or director exercised her vote at the
board of directors’ meeting authorizing them, no matter whether the contract
would have been authorized without her vote.117 In both cases, the action can
be brought by the company itself or by a shareholder acting individually.
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Similarly, under German civil law, a contract may be voidable under prin-
ciples of agency law if the agent colludes with a third party and abuses her
power to the detriment of her principal.118 Furthermore, in cases where a 
board member lacked the authority to bind the firm (see supra section II.1.),
the transaction is void.
Finally, if the company goes bankrupt, the bankruptcy trustee may challenge
self-dealing transactions by invoking fraudulent conveyance provisions. Pro-
vided that such transactions have been entered into in the proximity of in-
solvency, the court can declare them without effect.119 At least in Germany,
the practical significance of fraudulent conveyance provisions with respect to
self-dealing transactions in corporations is dwarfed by the concealed distri-
butions doctrine (which will also apply to the same cases),120 as vulnerability
periods for fraudulent conveyance are very short except in cases of inten-
tional hindrance of creditors121 or transactions without consideration.122
5. Summary
Our results regarding remedies are probably not new to continental Euro-
pean scholars, but they are of interest for the comparative debate: first, liabil-
ity suits remain rare for reasons that may rather be due to aspects procedural
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law, such as the absence of contingency fees and of a discovery procedure,
than corporate law. Second, nullification suits appear to be quite common.
However, we have seen that the possibility of such suits rests on the existence
of shareholder decision rights.
IV. Criminal sanctions applicable to tunneling
Each of the three jurisdictions provide for criminal sanctions against abusive
self-dealing. In France, the main criminal law tool against self-dealing is 
the provision against abuse of corporate assets (abus de biens sociaux).123 It
punishes, among others, board chairmen, directors or managing directors of 
a public limited company or a limited liability company (SARL) who “use
the company’s property or credit, in bad faith, in a way which they know is
contrary to the interests of the company, for personal purposes or to favor
another company or undertaking in which they have a direct or indirect 
interest.”124 The penalty is a prison term of up to five years (with no mini-
mum).
In France, the minority shareholder, acting derivatively in the name of the
company (action sociale ut singuli), can initiate a criminal prosecution by 
filing a criminal complaint (plainte avec constitution de partie civile) with the
Dean of the Examining magistrates (Doyen des Juges d’Instruction) of the 
Civil first degree court (Tribunal correctionnel). In order for the complaint to
be admissible, it is enough that the circumstances which gave rise to the com-
plaint allow the examining magistrate to consider “possible” the existence of
the damage to the company and the link with the alleged abuse of corporate
assets.125 Case law has long made it clear that the examining magistrate has 
a duty to investigate, as long as she deems this undemanding standard to be
met.126 This remedy is very attractive for minority shareholders since the 
examining judge holds the ability to access documents, and at no or very little
cost for the plaintiff shareholder. As a consequence, criminal prosecutions for
abus de biens sociaux are relatively frequent in France.
Some statistics as to the effectiveness of the abus de biens sociaux are avail-
able. According to the French Department of Justice, there have been be-
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tween 416 and 480 convictions for abus de biens sociaux in France every year
from 2000 to 2006.127 Unfortunately, the statistics from the French Depart-
ment of Justice are not so precise as to pinpoint whether the convictions for
abus de biens sociaux include a prison sentence without stay of execution
(prison ferme). However, the figures for criminal convictions relating to com-
pany law in general, which include abus de biens sociaux, indicate that in the
same years between 848 and 1075 decisions were taken, of which between
17 % to 22 % included a jail sentence without stay of execution128. If these
2000-2006 general statistics are applied to the convictions for abus de biens
sociaux, this would mean that an average of around 20 % of convictions for
abus de biens sociaux includes a jail term without a stay of execution129. This
would translate into 83 to 96 convictions a year between 2000 and 2006.130
French courts have created a special doctrine on abuse of corporate assets
within groups (the so-called Rozenblum doctrine).131 This doctrine admits 
a “group defense” under certain conditions. First, there must be a group 
characterized by capital links between the companies. Second, there must be
strong, effective business integration among the companies within the group.
Third, the financial support from one company to another company must
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have an economic quid pro quo and may not break the balance of mutual
commitments between the concerned companies. Fourth, the support from
the company must not exceed its possibilities. In other words, it should not
create a risk of bankruptcy for the company.132
In Germany, the criminal code punishes Untreue (disloyalty), which occurs
when a person authorized to dispose over someone else’s property or to bind
another person abuses her authority to do so, or when a person subject to 
a duty to attend to someone else’s financial interests violates the duty, and
when this results in a disadvantage to the other person.133 Normally, the
maximum penalty is five years, which may increase to 10 years in severe 
cases.134 Both members of the management board and the supervisory board
may be subject to the provision.135 The statute is quite broad, even excessive
risk-taking may result constitute Untreue,136 as can private benefits of control
by managers and board members.137 It also applies to directors of a con-
trolling firm in a corporate group with regard to the controlled firm’s 
property.138 In general, directors are not criminally liable under this statute if
the firm’s sole shareholder agrees with the transaction or if it is approved in 
a shareholder meeting.139 However, directors and others may still be liable
under criminal (and civil) law when the transactions puts the company’s 
existence at risk affects the firm’s legal capital.140
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sche Wochenschrift 2867, 2869. This case was decided with regard to a GmbH.
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The Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) reports 10,385 cases
of Untreue for 2006 and 12,032 for 2005.141 However, this data aggregates all
kind of Untreue cases, a small proportion of which (if any) reasonably involves
dominant shareholders’ self-dealing in public corporations.142 Furthermore, it
includes all cases that were brought to the attention of the police, among which
more than 98 % are reported as solved. That, however, does not necessarily
mean that they resulted in criminal prosecution and conviction. 
A recent case of Untreue made headlines. In the Mannesmann trial, following
a takeover battle against a hostile bid by Vodaphone, the supervisory board
granted an “appreciation award” to Mannesmann’s outgoing managing 
directors with the approval of Vodaphone’s largest shareholder.143 The case
ultimately did not result in a criminal conviction, but in the payment of a fine
as result of a settlement. Other notable cases where the directors of an AG
were prosecuted have related to unsecured lending within a corporate group
(both firms later went into bankruptcy)144 or corporate donations.145 The
practical significance of Untreue has risen in recent years.146 It is often
criticized by legal scholars as overly broad and unclear, particularly in the
context of business activity, where anything considered misconduct by courts
can potentially result in a conviction.147
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In Italy, directors and general managers are criminally liable for infedeltà 
patrimoniale (disloyalty) if, “having a conflict of interest with the corpora-
tion, and with the purpose of making an unfair profit or of letting someone
else make an unfair profit, they enter into, or take part in decisions relating
to, transactions on corporate assets, thereby intentionally harming the corpo-
ration.” 148 In the context of corporate groups, the provision accepts the idea
of “compensatory advantages:” while the crime requires intent to gain or let
others gain an “unjust profit”, a profit deemed to be made by the group of
companies is not unjust, whenever the company’s damage is offset by advan-
tages, whether actual or even only prospective, deriving from the relevant
company’s being part of the group.149
The prison term ranges from a minimum of six months to a maximum of
three years. However, criminal trials in Italy take a long time, while statute of
limitation terms for the crime are short and, with due qualifications, also run
during the trial; further, a criminal law provision allowing judges to suspend
the execution of criminal convictions to prison for a term of up to two years
in case of first-time offenders is widely applied. As a consequence, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that any director or manager will ever go to jail for such a
crime.150
Public prosecutors can only start prosecutions for this crime if the victim 
files a charge against the directors.151 Until recently, the common view was
that shareholders were not victims of the crime, an abuse of corporate assets
only harming directly the corporation, and shareholders’ indirect damage
being irrelevant for criminal law purposes.152 However, a recent Supreme
Court case included shareholders among crime victims,153 so that now they
may file a charge and also petition the criminal court for a conviction to dam-
ages suffered qua shareholders from the disloyalty (i.e. their pro rata share of
the total damage caused by the self-dealing transaction to the corporation).
For listed companies, a recent provision punishes directors who fail to dis-
close to other board members their interest in a transaction, if such a failure
to disclose causes damages to the corporation or other parties. The prison
term ranges from a minimum of one year to a maximum of three.154
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Finally, all three countries punish banqueroute, bancarotta fraudolenta, and
Bankrott, a crime that includes asset diversion, whether through self-dealing
or otherwise, in insolvent corporations or in corporations that are driven to
insolvency as a consequence of such diversion.155
To conclude, we can say that criminal law plays a different role in the three
jurisdictions. While in Italy it only effectively punishes self-dealing in the
context of bankruptcy,156 criminal prosecution of Untreue in Germany is also
possible outside bankruptcy. Finally, criminal enforcement is of particular
importance in France, where minority shareholders can bring a “derivative”
criminal claim on behalf of the company. This is particularly attractive as the
examining magistrate has much better access to evidence than shareholders.
V. Stock dilution
With stock dilution, the ultimate outcome is similar as in cases of tunneling,
i.e. minority shareholders’ value is depressed, but the process is quite dif-
ferent. While tunneling happens through business transactions of the corpo-
ration, majority shareholders (i.e. the company’s board on their input) have
to initiate an amendment to the corporate charter in continental Europe in
order to dilute the minority’s stock. The first type of possibly stock-diluting
transaction are increases of capital, and most of all recapitalizations following
losses, where the minority’s shares are diluted if the majority shareholder
contributes new capital to the firm at an undervalue.
Parent-subsidiary mergers and squeeze-outs are the second important form
of self-dealing discussed here. Minority shareholders of the subsidiary may
be deprived of their share of firm value if the exchange ratio between shares
of the parent and the subsidiary is unfair to the latter’s shareholders, i.e. when
the estimate of the subsidiary’s value is too low.
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May be because the danger resulting from these mechanisms is quite obvious,
all three jurisdictions address the issue mostly with rule-based safeguards.
1. Recapitalizations
All three jurisdictions, with due qualifications and exemptions, provide for
safeguards against stock dilution in the form of targeted issues of new shares.
Following the Second Directive, all three countries grant shareholders a pre-
emption right over new issues of shares.157 However, the shareholder meeting
can resolve to exclude such right with regard to specific new issues of shares.
Typically, specific reporting requirements must be followed.158 In Germany,
courts have required an objective reason,159 which could be given e.g. when
the company intends to recapitalize following a period of severe losses, and
struck down shareholder meeting resolutions based on inadequate reasons.
Similarly, Italian law requires that the decision not to grant pre-emptive
rights be not only justified, but also “necessary to attain the company’s 
interest.”160 Under French law, the board of directors must provide a report
giving the reasons for the resolution as the Second Company Law Directive
requires,161 but, other than in Germany and Italy, there is no substantive 
judicial review on whether the exclusion of preemptive rights is justified.
2. Mergers and squeezeouts
The laws of all three countries provide procedural and disclosure require-
ments that have been set forth in the Third Directive for public corpora-
tions.162 Mergers are subject to a shareholder meeting resolution163 following
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157 Second Directive, art. 29(1). The second directive requires preemptive rights only in
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158 Article L. 225-135, French C. Com.; § 186 IV AktG, with respect to which courts have
required an objective reason; Article 2441, Italian C.c.
159 BGH 13.3.1978, II ZR 142/76 (“Kali+Salz”), BGHZ 71, 40; BGH 19.4.1982, II ZR
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160 Article 2441, Italian Civil Code. Leaving aside the doctrinal intricacies of this word-
ing, courts tend to engage in a substantial review of the resolution’s consistency with
the corporate interest in applying the provision. See Federico M. Mucciarelli, Interesse
sociale ed esclusione del diritto d’opzione: spunti di riflessione sulla logica dell’argo-
mentazione del giudice, 2002 Giurisprudenza Commerciale I/455, I/459–63.
161 Article L. 225-135, French C. Com. The relevant section is art. 29(4) of the Second Di-
rective. The equivalent provision in Germany is § 186 IV AktG. For Italy, see Article
2441(6) C.c.
162 Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the
Treaty concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, 1978 O. J. (L 295) 36–43.
163 Third Directive, Article 7.
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a report by the board of directors which must explain “the draft terms of
merger and set […] out the legal and economic grounds for them, in particu-
lar the share exchange ratio.”164 According to the Directive, “[o]ne or more
experts, acting on behalf of each of the merging companies but independent
of them, appointed or approved by a judicial or administrative authority,
shall examine the draft terms of merger and draw up a written report to the
shareholders.”165 In the report, “the experts must in any case state whether in
their opinion the share exchange ratio is fair and reasonable.”166
In Italy, shareholders can challenge the validity of the merger resolution if
they have the minimum stake required in general for such challenges.167
However, once the merger contract has been deposited in the companies 
register, the court may not declare the resolution void and shareholders may
only obtain damages from the company and its directors, e.g. if the exchange
ratio is unfair.168
Squeeze-out or cash-out mergers are not allowed under Italian law. The
squeeze-out remedy is only available to majority shareholders of listed com-
panies having crossed the threshold of 98 (soon to be 95) percent of the 
shares following a bid for all the outstanding shares.169
In France, the decision to merge, and indirectly the exchange ratio, cannot be
challenged unless there is an abuse of majority, which is difficult to prove.
Minority shareholders can also sue the expert in case of mistake, but there are
very few cases. Besides, a major flaw in the protection of minority share-
holders is that if it is the subsidiary that incorporates its parent company, the
parent company, despite its obvious conflict of interest, may vote on the mer-
ger resolution, which is not the case if the parent incorporates the subsidiary.
However, for listed companies, the French securities regulator can force a 
controlling shareholder to initiate a buyout offer (offre publique de retrait)
when she has decided to merge the controlled company into the controlling
company.170 This provision can be used by the securities regulator, for ex-
ample, if it deems the exchange ratio to be unacceptable.
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Finally, squeezeouts (retrait obligatoire) are only possible in listed compa-
nies.171 The majority shareholder needs to hold more than 95 % of the capital
or of the votes following a buyout offer (offre publique de retrait).
In Germany, the unfairness of the exchange ratio may not be the ground for
lawsuits seeking to nullify the merger resolution by shareholders of the com-
pany whose assets are transferred.172 In this situation, they have a claim to
compensation in cash.173 If the compensation is too low, they may petition a
court to set the amount (under the award specification procedure described
below).174 Equivalent rules apply to transformations into a different legal
form,175 squeezeouts (which can be requested upon the petition of a 95 %
shareholder)176 and organizational integrations of one corporation into 
another.177 The consequence of these rules is that it is considerably hard for
minority shareholders to block a merger. The idea is that the transaction
should not be stopped by a (possibly frivolous) shareholder suit. Finally,
members of the management and supervisory boards may be subject to liabil-
ity.178
As hinted before, the creation of a contractual group has similar consequences
to those of a merger. Hence, there are similar safeguards as those regarding
mergers, i.e. a control agreement requires the approval of a 75 percent super-
majority of shareholders in the controlled company and in the controlling
entity (if it is also an AG),179 and certain reporting and auditing requirements
must be met. To compensate for these disadvantages, the controlling entity
must also absorb losses made by the controlled corporation,180 and the con-
trol agreement must stipulate an annual payment to minority shareholders.181
Furthermore, a control agreement must give minority shareholders a right 
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171 Article L. 433-4, French Financial and Monetary Code.
172 § 14 II UmwG. By contrast, shareholders of the company to which the assets are
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173 § 15 UmwG.
174 § 34 UmwG. See infra note 184 and corresponding text.
175 §§ 196, 212 UmwG.
176 §§ 327a, 327f AktG.
177 § 320b AktG.
178 §§ 25 et seq UmwG.
179 § 293 AktG.
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see Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, ‘Related Party Transactions’, in Reinier Kraak-
man et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law 101, 125 (2004) (claiming that a derivative
suit is possible). However, it is certain that directors of the controlled company have a
duty to enforce this claim.
181 § 304 I, II AktG.
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to exit, i.e. the controlling entity must offer to purchase their shares for an
adequate compensation consisting of shares of the controlling entity if it is 
an AG182 or otherwise of cash.183 As in a merger, the shareholder resolution 
to accept the control agreement may not be void or nullified on the grounds
that the annual compensation or the compensation for leaving the controlled
firm is too low. However, shareholders may petition a court to stipulate 
an adequate compensation or share exchange ratio (so-called Spruchstellen-
verfahren, or “award specification procedure”).184
3. Summary
As we have seen, there are specific mechanisms against stock dilution in all of
the three countries, which are partly influenced by EC law. In the case of 
recapitalizations, at least in Italy and Germany shareholders may challenge
the validity of the resolution approving a recapitalization on the ground of 
an insufficient “objective reason” for the exclusion of preemptive rights. In
the case of mergers, scissions and squeezeouts, such a reason is not required
to justify the transaction as such, but minority shareholders may obtain 
monetary compensation for an unfair exchange ratio.
VI. Conclusion: a research agenda
The starting point for our overview of the three main continental European
countries laws on self-dealing by dominant shareholders was the most recent
law and finance study by LLSV, which focuses precisely on self-dealing laws.
According to their scores, Italy and France display approximately the same
quality of law, while Germany lags behind. Our overview makes no attempt
to translate legal rules into scores. It shows, instead, that all three countries
provide a large array of doctrines and remedies against self-dealing, some of
them incidentally quite different from those familiar to English-speaking
scholars. It is far from easy to tell what jurisdiction among the three has the
most effective rules, and it is even harder to evaluate how well they fare com-
pared to US or UK law. However, we have shown some peculiar features of
the three countries’ legal framework, which might at least reduce the per-
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ceived gap between the Anglo-American framework and the continental 
European one. The German prohibition against concealed distributions has
so far received little – if any – attention in the international debate regarding
self-dealing. Similarly, the role of minority shareholders in the prosecution of
abus de biens sociaux in France has so far been neglected. Finally, we have
highlighted the importance of nullification suits in all three countries and 
especially in Germany and Italy, although recent reforms, in Italy more than
in Germany, have cut the teeth of this remedy.
We have also shown that liability suits are permitted in all three countries,
with France requiring no minimum holding to bring suit, and Germany and
Italy doing the same in the crucial area of group law. However, it is well
known that these suits remain rare compared to the US, even where there no
minimum thresholds apply. As hinted above, the reason for the absence of
private enforcement may rather be issues of procedural law, such as the 
absence of contingency fees and of a discovery procedure, for which the 
possibility to request the appointment of a special auditor does not seem to
make up.
To evaluate the effectiveness of these legal frameworks to protect minority
shareholder interests, empirical work focusing on the law in action is needed.
While anecdotal evidence exists as to what extent and in which situation 
the doctrines and remedies we have identified are used in each of the three
countries, there has been no systematic effort so far to categorize decisions
and to find out under which circumstances self-dealing is likely to be
sanctioned by the courts. A companion paper thus uses the legal framework
outlined throughout this paper to proceed into such an investigation by look-
ing at a large sample of published decisions from French, German and Italian
courts.185 Although our focus is restricted to a low number of countries, we
believe we can provide a more vivid and genuine picture of self-dealing laws
in three main European jurisdictions.
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straints on Dominant Shareholders in Continental Europe’, work in progress (on file
with the authors).
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